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CASE DIGEST
This CASE DIGEST provides brief analyses of cases that represent current aspects of transnational law. The Digest includes cases that establish legal principles and cases that apply established legal principles to
different factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories
and references are given for further research.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS ............................
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY .....................
III. IMMIGRATION .......................................
IV. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT ..............
I.

379

380
382
383

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

SECRETARY

OF TRANSPORTATION'S

ORDER

ISSUED

PURSUANT

TO

ANTI-APARTHEID ACT, WHICH IMMEDIATELY REVOKED SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS RIGHT

To

NOTWITHSTANDING

POSSIBLE

AGREEMENT

-

SERVE UNITED STATES AIRPORTS, UPHELD

VIOLATION

OF

PRIOR

EXECUTIVE

South African Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119 (D.C.

Cir. 1987).
In October 1986 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid
Act of 1986 (the "Act"), Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086, which
contained provisions designed to terminate service by South African Airways ("SAA") to the United States. Section 306(b)(1) of the Act directs
the Secretary of State to terminate SAA's service pursuant to the procedures of the executive agreement (the "Agreement") between the United
States and South Africa which allowed for this service since 1947. See
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Union of South Africa Relating to Air Service
Between Their Respective Territories, May 23, 1947, United StatesSouth Africa, 61 Stat. 3057, T.I.A.S. No. 1639, as amended by 4 U.S.T.
2205, T.I.A.S. No. 2870, and 19 U.S.T. 5193, T.I.A.S. No. 6512. The
Agreement provides that the Secretary of State shall give South Africa
notice of United States intention to terminate one year prior to actual
termination. Section 306(a)(2) states that "[tjen days after the enactment
of this Act, the President shall direct the Secretary of Transportation to
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revoke" the SAA permit. The Secretary of State gave the one year notice
prescribed by the Agreement. The Secretary of Transportation, however,
issued an order that immediately revoked the SAA permit.
SAA filed a petition to set aside the order and argued essentially that
because § 306(a)(2) does not require immediate revocation of SAA's permit, the Secretary of Transportation should be required to adopt an interpretation of the Act that does not conflict with the Agreement. SAA
based this argument on the principle that a congressional statute must be
construed whenever possible so that it will not require the United States
"to violate the law of nations." Murray v. The Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). Moreover, SAA argued that if
Congress intended to abrogate the Agreement, that purpose "must not be
lightly assumed, but must appear clearly and distinctly from the words
used in the statute." United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 221
(1902); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
The court of appeals denied the SAA petition to set aside and held
that the Secretary of Transportation correctly interpreted § 306(a)(2) of
the Act which "unambiguously calls for expedited revocation of any permit issued" to SAA even though the revocation might abrogate the prior
Agreement. The court stated that while § 306(a) does not expressly direct the Secretary of Transportation to immediately revoke the SAA permit, the congressional intent gathered from circumstances surrounding
the enactment of § 306(a) and its accompanying debate leads to the conclusion that Congress intended the Secretary of Transportation to act
immediately. The court declined to decide whether § 306(a) in fact violates the Agreement because Congress, assuming there was a violation,
has express constitutional power to regulate foreign commerce. U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8. Significance - The court of appeals' construction of §
306 of the Act provides judicial support for the Secretary of Transportation's decision to immediately revoke the SAA permit despite the Act's
possible conflict with the Agreement.
II.

EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY

IN TRANSNATIONAL

LITIGATION, HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION IS

NOT MANDATORY, EXCLUSIVE, OR PROCEDURE OF FIRST RESORT,
BUT UNITED STATES COURT MAY RESORT TO CONVENTION'S DISCOVERY PROCEDURES

To

SUPPLEMENT FEDERAL DISCOVERY RULES

Societe Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale v. United States District Courtfor the Southern District of
WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT -
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Iowa, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
Plaintiffs brought a products liability suit for personal injuries sustained in an airplane crash against the plane's maker and seller, two
corporations owned by the Republic of France. Defendants answered
plaintiffs' complaint and initial discovery request, but objected to plaintiffs' additional discovery request made according to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Defendants sought a protective court order denying the
additional discovery request on grounds that in transnational litigation
the Hague Evidence Convention provides the exclusive and mandatory
discovery procedure for obtaining documents and information located
within the territory of a foreign signatory. See The Hague Convention
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No.
7444. A magistrate for the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa denied the motion for a protective order.
Defendants sought review of the denial by a writ of mandamus from
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court of appeals denied the
petition for mandamus holding that as long as the district court has jurisdiction over the foreign litigants, the Hague Convention does not apply to the production of evidence in that litigant's possession, regardless
of the physical location of the evidence. 782 F.2d 120, 124 (8th Cir.
1986). Defendants sought review of this decision by the United States
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court, held that in transnational litigation the discovery procedures of
the Hague Evidence Convention are permissive and supplementary to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are not mandatory or exclusive. Justice Stevens based this interpretation on the absence of
mandatory or compulsory language in the Convention's preamble and
the use of permissive language throughout the Convention's text. A majority of the Court rejected a rule of first resort to the Convention and
directed United States courts to resort to the Convention when the circumstances of the case warrant. In a separate opinion Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor, wrote that while
he agreed that the Convention's procedures should not be exclusive, he
disagreed with the case-by-case inquiry method to determine whether to
use the Convention's procedures. Justice Blackmun stated that he
"would apply a general presumption that, in most cases, courts should
resort first to the Convention's procedures." Significance - This decision establishes the relation between the discovery rules of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Hague Evidence Convention that
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United States courts must observe in transnational litigation. The Hague
Convention provides a supplementary procedure for gathering evidence
abroad which a United States court may resort to if the particular case
warrants.
III.

IMMIGRATION

Two YEAR PROCESSING DELAY OF APPLICATION FOR ADJUSTMENT
OF IMMIGRATION STATUS NOT ADEQUATE To SHOW "AFFIRMATIVE
MISCONDUCT" AND APPLY DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
AGAINST IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE Wang v.

United States, 823 F.2d 1273 (8th Cir. 1987).
Wang, a former Taiwanese diplomat, sought adjustment of his immigration status from diplomat to permanent resident under § 13 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of September 11, 1957, Pub. L. No.
85-316, 71 Stat. 642 (amended 1981), current version at 8 U.S.C. §
1255b(b) (1982). On March 23, 1979, Wang delivered a completed application and the required supporting documents to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") in Kansas City. On April 25, 1980,
Wang delivered additional completed medical examination reports to the
Kansas City INS office and two weeks later Wang's entire file was forwarded for further processing to the INS office in Washington, D.C. On
August 25, 1980, the Washington INS returned Wang's file to Kansas
City INS requesting further information and expedition of the matter;
however, Kansas City INS did not provide expedited treatment. Nine
months passed before Kansas City INS contacted Wang at which time
Wang resubmitted supporting documents he believed he had already
submitted in March 1979. During these delays Congress amended § 13
to require the applicant to also show "compelling reasons" why the applicant is unable to return to the native country and that adjustment of
status would be in the national interest of the United States. 8 U.S.C. §
1255b(b)(1982). Following the effective date of the amendments, December 29, 1981, the INS requested that Wang submit evidence to meet the
additional requirements of § 13 as amended.
In response, Wang sought a declaratory judgment that the 1981
amendments did not apply to his application and that the INS must apply the prior law to his application. The district court held that the INS
was estopped from applying the 1981 amendments to Wang's claim because it found that (1) Wang had reasonably relied to his detriment on
timely processing, but the INS had unreasonably delayed; and (2) the
INS committed affirmative misconduct by attempting to blame Wang for
its own mishandling of the application. 636 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Mo.
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1986).
The INS appealed this order claiming that Wang had not met the
strict requirements for estoppel against the government. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that the INS delay and improper blaming of Wang did not constitute affirmative misconduct. The
court of appeals concluded that while the INS acts were negligent and
possibly in bad faith, the acts were "less egregious than, or at most,...
substantially equivalent to government misconduct that was found not to
constitute affirmative misconduct" in two similar cases decided by the
Supreme Court. See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14 (1982) (per curiam);
Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961). Significance - Despite the
obvious inequitable result, this decision is consistent with previous Supreme Court decisions, which have never upheld an estoppel against the
United States.
IV.

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT

COMMERCIAL

CARRIER OF FOREIGN STATE IS NOT IMMUNE FROM

UNITED STATES JURISDICTION IF A NEXUS EXISTS BETWEEN ITS
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE CAUSE OF

ACTION -

Barkanic v. CAAC, 822 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1987).

Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against China Airlines
("CAAC"), an agent of the People's Republic of China, following the
crash of a domestic flight in China in which two United States passengers were killed. Those passengers purchased their tickets for the flight
in the United States. Because the tickets had to be confirmed in China
and the flight was entirely within China, the district court dismissed the
suit and held that the "commercial activities" exception to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), did not
allow for subject matter jurisdiction.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the FSIA allows for subject matter jurisdiction over CAAC because the tickets which were
bought in the United States from agents of CAAC provided the jurisdictional nexus between the cause of action and the commercial activity.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals modified its view of § 1605(a)(2)
of the FSIA as previously stated in Ministry of Supply, Cairo v. Universal Tankships, Inc., 708 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1983), to comport with the
Fifth Circuit's reading of the Ministry of Supply, Cario opinion. See
Vancedora Oceanica Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navagation, 730 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1984).
According to the Fifth Circuit view, jurisdiction under § 1605(a)(2)
requires a nexus between the commercial activity in the United States
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and the cause of action. In this case the nexus occurred through a CAAC
contract with Pan American Airlines, which acted as an agent in this
country for CAAC and sold the tickets for the ill-fated flight to the decedents. Significance - In deciding this case the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals has modified its interpretation of § 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA to
comport with the interpretation that several other circuits have announced. See Vencedora OcedanicaNavigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 370 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1984); Gilson
v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Velidor v. LI
PIG Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 455 U.S.

929 (1982).

